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Second, the Court determined whether the Guidelines caused an injury to
the Nation's generalized interest in Lower Basin water. Although the Nation
does not have decreed rights to Lower Basin water, it may still be eligible for
standing because the need for water to sustain the Reservation is a cognizable
interest that may provide standing under NEPA. The Nation's argument was
simply that it would have less Lower Basin water available due to the Guidelines.
It contended that the Surplus Guidelines would limit the Nation's supply by
allocating all surplus water each year, and the Shortage Guidelines would limit
the Nation's supply because its share is charged against Arizona's apportionment, which is already the smallest of the Lower Basin apportionments. The
Nation feared that either excessive "Intentionally Created Surplus" ("ICS") development or an increased likelihood of a declared shortage will reduce the
availability of water for its lands.
The Court held that the Nation has not suffered an injury to its generalized
interest in water suflicient for Article III standing. First, the Guidelines merely
prescribe the conditions necessary to declare either surplus or shortage-they
do not make allotnents of water themselves. Second, a statute-not the Guidelines-provides the prioritization scheme that disadvantages Arizona. Third, the
Nation failed to demonstrate how the Guidelines would make it more likely
that a shortage will be declared. Finally, the Nation's argument that excessive
ICS development will limit its supply of water was flawed because the Guidelines only allow users to bank water for the purpose of banking it-users must
offset their water consumption when any of it is banked.
Finally, the Court held that the Nation's breach of trust claim against the
United States was not barred by sovereign immunity. Section 702 of the APA
provides that a party who suffers a legal wrong as a result of agency action is not
barred from filing suit against the agency or an officer thereof on the ground
that it is against the United States.
There was a split in the Ninth Circuit regarding the interpretation of Section
702, so the Court consolidated the two interpretations into one rule. The Court
concluded that: (1) Section 702 waives sovereign immunity for allnon-monetary
claims; and (2) Section 704's final agency action requirement is limited only to
actions brought under the APA. Because the Nation sought non-monetary relief against DOI, DOI's sovereign immunity was waived.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the Nation is
not entitled to relief for its NEPA claims. However, the Court reversed the
district court's ruling that the Nation's breach of trust claim was barred by sovereign immunity and remanded it to the district court for full consideration on
the issue.

Ganir Puglielli
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, NO. 1:15-CV-01290IJO-GSA, 2017 WL 1375232 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017) (holding that: (i) if an
agency justifiably relied on a specific provision of a federal act to make Flow

312

WA TER LA WREVIEW

Volume 21

Augmentation releases, claims attacking the agency's reliance on other provisions of the act will fail, and (ii) claims attacking Flow Augmentation releases
under NEPA are moot and do not meet the "capable of repetition yet evading
review" exception when an agency adopts a Long-Term Plan EIS that makes it
unlikely the agency will follow the same procedures).
In order to reduce the risk of fish kill in the Lower Klamath River, the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation ("the Bureau") made Flow Augmentation releases
("FARs") in both 2014 and 2015 from Lewiston Dam, which is a part of the
Trinity River Division. The Bureau released a total of 64,000 acre-feet of water
in connection with the 2014 FARs. In 2015, the Bureau planned on making
similar FARs and prepared an Environmental Assessment ("EA") according to
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). After the Bureau released
the EA, the San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority and the Westlands
Water District filed suit against the Bureau and its parent agency, the Department of the Interior, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California. The lawsuit included eight separate claims for relief, as well as a
request for injunctive relief that was quickly denied.
I The first, second, and third claims for relief challenged the Bureau's statutory authority to make FARs. To justify the 2014 FARs, the Bureau relied on
a proviso of a federal 1955 Act (the Act), which authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to adopt measures that protect fish and wildlife including maintaining

the flow of the Trinity River below the diversion point ("Proviso 1"). Plaintiffs
asserted in their second claim that Proviso 1 did not give the Bureau the authority to implement the 2014 FARs. While this lawsuit was pending, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided this issue, finding that the Bureau has the
authority to implement FARs under Proviso 1. In light of the Ninth Circuit's
decision, the Court found the second claim to be moot and dismissed the claim
with prejudice.
The Bureau also relied on a second proviso of the Act to justify the 2014
and 2015 FARs-this proviso required that at least 50,000 acre-feet of water be
released annually from the Trinity River and be made available to downstream
users ("Proviso 2"). The first and third claims attacked the Bureau's reliance
on Proviso 2. The first claim alleged that Proviso 2 did not give the Bureau the
legal authority for FARs. The third claim alleged that even if the Bureau had
legal authority under Proviso 2, reclamation law still requires that the Bureau
enter into a contract for delivery of the water. The Court found that the Bureau
had specifically relied on both Proviso 1 and Proviso 2 in justifying the FARs.
Because the Court already concluded that the Bureau had the authority to make
FARs under Proviso 1, the Court found that the first and third claims attacking
Proviso 2 were moot The Court dismissed these two claims without prejudice,
contemplating a future challenge to FARs where the FARs are justified solely
on Proviso 2.
The fourth and fifth claims alleged that the Bureau did not follow procedures required by NEPA. The fourth claim asserted that the Bureau's EA for
the 2015 FARs did not meet NEPA requirements and that the Bureau also
needed to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"). The fifth claim
alleged that the Bureau also acted unlawfully by not preparing either an EA or
and EIS for the 2014 FARs. The Court found that these claims were technically
moot "because the 2014 and 2015 FARs expired of their own accord."
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However, because the duration of FARs is so short relative to the timeline
of litigation, the Court entertained that these claims might still be valid as capable of repetition yet evading review. However, the Court found that the claims
did not meet this exception to mootness because there was no evidence that this
same controversy would be likely to occur again. In making its determination,
the Court relied on the Bureau's recently issued Long-Term Plan to Protect
Adult Salmon in the Lower Klamath River EIS, which identifies FARs as a proposed action and makes it unlikely that the Bureau would follow the same procedures for FARs as it did in 2014 and 2015. The Court also pointed out that
even though the Long-Term Plan EIS only runs through 2030, that lack of clarity did not give rise to a demonstrated probability that the controversy would
occur again. The Court dismissed the fourth and fifth claims without prejudice
to a renewed claim with new facts showing the controversy is likely to recur.
The sixth, seventh, and eighth claims alleged that the Bureau did not comply with requirements in the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act ("MSA"). While this lawsuit was pending, the Ninth Circuit addressed nearly identical claims in a companion case and found that the plaintiffs there did not have standing for their
ESA and MSA claims. Accordingly, the Court requested a supplemental briefing in light of that decision and did not decide the merits of the sixth, seventh,
and eighth claims.
Jeremy Frankel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLORADO
United States v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42298 (D. Colo. 2017) (certifying unopposed facts surrounding Denver's conditional right to 654 cfs from the Blue River Decree and vacating the 1977 Order. compelling federal jurisdiction over m-state water issues arismig from the
Blue River Decree).
The ruling in this case from the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado resolves a long-standing issue involving federal jurisdiction over
water law in Colorado. The United States first brought this action in 1949 to
determine federal interests in the water flowing from the Blue River and stored
in the Green Mountain and Dillon reservoirs. Between 1949 and 1955, various
companion cases were joined to the first action. These cases involved nonfederal water rights but remained under the jurisdiction of the district court under the terms of the 1955 Decree settling the original dispute.
The instant issue arises under thatlong arm of federal jurisdiction. In 2006
(and with an amended complaint in 2013), Denver sought to make absolute an
additional portion of its conditional rights under the 1955 Decree, which
granted the city a conditional right to 788 cfs. Prior rulings had made absolute
520 cfs, to which Denver wanted to add 134 cfs, bringing its total absolute right
to 654 cfs. All parties who initially opposed this change reached independent
agreements with Denver outside of the court system. Thus, the court found no

